SSL/TLS Decryption

uncovering secrets

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- Wireshark contributor since 2013, core developer since 2015.
- Areas of interest: TLS, Lua, security, ...
- Developed a VoIP product based on WebRTC.
- InfoSec Master's student @ TU/e (NL).
- Cloudflare crypto intern in 2017.

- Things that people care about: pictures, videos, documents, email conversations, passwords, ...
- Application Data: cookies, API keys, Request URI, User Agent, form data, response body, ...
- How to keep these safe when sending it over the internet or over your local Wi-Fi network?



- Provides secure communication channel between two endpoints (client and server).
- Network protocol with two components:
  - Handshake Protocol: exchange capabilities, establish trust and establish keys.
  - Record Protocol: carries messages and protects application data fragments.



- SSLv3: old (RFC 6101, 1996) and deprecated (RFC 7568, 2015). Do not use it!
- TLS 1.0 (RFC 2246, 1999), 1.1 (RFC 4346, 2006), 1.2 (RFC 5246, 2008).
- Changes:
  - New versions are generally fixing weaknesses due to new attacks.
  - TLS 1.0 (RFC 3546, 2003) and up allow for extensions, like Server Name Indication (SNI) to support virtual hosts.
  - TLS 1.2: new authenticated encryption with additional data (AEAD) mode.
- "SSL" term still stuck, e.g. "SSL certificate", "SSL library" and field names in Wireshark (e.g. `ssl.record.content_type`).
- Mail protocols: *TLS* often refers to *STARTTLS* while *SSL* directly starts with the handshake.

- Symmetric-key algorithms: encrypt/decrypt bulk (application) data using a single (secret) *symmetric key*. Examples: AES, 3DES, RC4.
- How to create such a secret? For example, AES-256 needs a 256-bit key.
- Public-key cryptography: a (secret) *private key* and a related *public key*.
  - Mathematically hard to compute private key from public key.
  - Encrypt data with *public key*, decrypt with *private key*.
  - Limitation: maximum data size for RSA is equal to modulus size, 2048-4096 bits.
  - Idea: generate a random *premaster secret* and encrypt it with the **RSA public key**.
- Where to retrieve this **RSA public key** from?

- Public key is embedded in an X.509 certificate.
- How can this certificate be trusted?
- A Certificate Authority (issuer) signs the certificate with its private key.
- Public-key cryptography: use a private (secret) key and a public key with small data.
  - Compress data using a hash function. Examples: SHA256, SHA1, MD5.
  - Sign hash with private key, verify with public key. Examples: RSA, ECDSA.
- Root CAs are self-signed and installed by the OS vendor or local admin (Group Policy, etc.).



- Client Hello advertises supported parameters, Server Hello decides.
- Server picks RSA key exchange: TLS_**RSA**_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA.





+ Certificate (with RSA public key)
+ ServerHelloDone

- Client received Server Hello and now knows protocol version and cipher suite.
- Client generates a new random 48-byte **premaster secret**, encrypts it using the *public key* from the Certificate and sends the encrypted result to the server in a *ClientKeyExchange* message.
- Using the private RSA key, server (or anyone else!) decrypts the premaster secret.

```
Handshake Protocol: Client Key Exchange
    Handshake Type: Client Key Exchange (16)
    Length: 130
  RSA Encrypted PreMaster Secret
      Encrypted PreMaster length: 128
      Encrypted PreMaster: 6714b8c800549d2857d2484f7d184a6d7e2d186b7e4322b0...
```

- Both sides calculate the 48-byte **master secret** based on the Client Random, Server Random and the premaster secret.
- Both sides derive symmetric keys from this master secret, send the *ChangeCipherSpec* message to start record protection.
- Finally they both finish the Handshake protocol by sending a *Finished* Handshake message over the encrypted record layer.
- Now the actual encrypted *Application Data* can be sent and received.





Simplified TLS handshake (adapted from RFC 5246 (TLS 1.2))

- Server administrators can check application logs.
- Web browsers provide developer tools.
- What if the information is not logged?
- What if you want to know what this third-party Android app is doing?
- What if the application under investigation is poorly documented?
- What if you want to debug your new HTTP/2 feature?
- Solution: packet capture plus SSL/TLS secrets!

Configure Wireshark with a RSA private key file[1]:





- IP address is unused and ignored. Port + Protocol can be empty. These three fields will be removed in future.
- Specify (passwordless) PEM-encoded key file *or* PKCS#12 key file + password.

```
-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
MIIEvQIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKcwggSjAgEAAoIBAQDSejtB5QbSkaLM
g3rGsB91YOMzJTkuDVpQEIDcz4qP/j5zO8wS1kl2t/uZMMvYHE7B0z3udKayEFmh
NEibuJdJUzWbbda3UvTPZ6JLf5wAm6T6BHUpjUsfZvMfGorx8fVBtd8WbCXL7PFK
...
NsRXfSXtVphoograxijgG/RfKcTmiOcOnuckopyKDuBSyDY3HnPrTBLm7FuKMew0
bWgn4GfGdwuvP9C+FoaG8+s=
-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
```

[1] See `https://wiki.wireshark.org/SSL#Preference_Settings`

- Clients usually do not have access to the RSA key, only server operators can use it.
- In case of mutual authentication (client certificates), the private key is only used for *signing*. The client private RSA key cannot decrypt.
- Encrypted premaster secret is not sent with resumed sessions.

```
Client                                               Server

ClientHello                  -------->
                                                ServerHello
                                              [ChangeCipherSpec]
                             <--------             Finished
[ChangeCipherSpec]
Finished                     -------->
Application Data             <------->     Application Data
```

Message flow for an abbreviated handshake (RFC 5246, Figure 2)

- Decryption using RSA private key not possible with cipher suites like TLS_EC**DHE**_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 and TLS_EC**DHE**_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256.
- Although it has *RSA* in its name, it is not used for encryption, but signing.
- Instead it uses *Diffie-Hellman* to establish a shared secret (the **premaster secret**) based on *ephemeral* secrets (different secrets for every session).
- Server chooses a group/curve, generates private value and its related public value and sends it to the client. Client uses same group/curve and also generates a pair.
- Computationally hard to find the private value given the public one.



- Any of these can be used for decryption with passive captures:
  - premaster secret: RSA-encrypted or output from DH key exchange.
  - Master secret: derived from premaster secret and handshake messages. Also used for session resumption.
  - Symmetric encryption key for record encryption.
  - RSA private key file (for RSA key exchange, covered before).
- So how to use master secrets?

- Text file with master secrets[2].
- Works for any cipher, including RSA and DHE.
- Clients can use this too!
- Set environment variable `SSLKEYLOGFILE` before starting Firefox or Chrome. The variable is only read during startup, so restart if necessary.
- Format: `CLIENT_RANDOM` *<Client Hello Random> <master secret>*.

```
# SSL/TLS secrets log file, generated by NSS
CLIENT_RANDOM 5f4dad779789bc5142cacf54f5dafba0a06235640796f40048ce4d0d1df63ad8 a4d69a3fa4222d6b6f2492e66dca2b1fc4e2bc143df849ad45eff9f
CLIENT_RANDOM c2407d5ba931798e3a35f775725fb3e5aefcb5804bb50271fe3bd5fb19c90061 e419759e7b44f766df6defe6b656eda3d430754044773b6fc0a91eb
CLIENT_RANDOM abec6cf83ea1dcb135b21fd94bc0120dd6a37dca0fcd96efd8989d05c51cc3ab 5b4d525dfe3168132d388881033633c2aba99346c25ae8163f2191f
CLIENT_RANDOM dffe2c85a7d6f3c3ec34ba52ea710f0f1649e58afa02f9824d983ea74f07900e fdb58d49482f876f200ce680b9d6987434e3aca54d203fc57cc5888
CLIENT_RANDOM fbf40ada961093cd917fba97bfffe7c4b0bbf57a0cf90626dee417d3d12b3755 6b4e313d6be9316c42f47ddd3ceeef9743825bd3c3bb25ec9ac73c9
CLIENT_RANDOM 2b8184f7642df4bb5979ad9a623690b08f392deb94fdb64b00d7dc78b711638b dfdbe9f4d6949eea02489eb39b2c8d7770c12928becaf0ac1e34edf
CLIENT_RANDOM 7e4340c76c720d39c98e761697be0f32e1c79c6c04ade05a3f29325ac9cae612 1dfe402b85560048ae278b78febe83ee1640785b969c328d94a785a
```

[2]File format at `https://developer.mozilla.org/NSS_Key_Log_Format`

- Configure file in Wireshark preferences: Edit → Preferences; Protocols → SSL; (Pre-)Master Secret log filename.
- Key log file is also read during a live capture. And if the file is removed and a new file is written, the new key log file is automatically read.
  - Caveat: key log is read while processing ChangeCipherSpec. If key is written too late, trigger a redissection (e.g. change a preference or (Un)ignore a packet).

- Any application built using NSS and GnuTLS enable key logging via the `SSLKEYLOGFILE` environment variable.
- Applications using OpenSSL 1.1.1 or BoringSSL d28f59c27bac (2015-11-19) can be configured to dump keys:

```
void SSL_CTX_set_keylog_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
    void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, const char *line));
```

- ARM Mbed TLS using a debug callback[3].
- cURL supports many TLS backends, including NSS, GnuTLS and OpenSSL. Key logging with OpenSSL/BoringSSL is possible since curl 7.56.0[4].
- Java applications can use jSSLKeyLog[5].

[3] `https://github.com/Lekensteyn/mbedtls/commit/68aea15`
[4] Requires a build time option, see `https://curl.haxx.se/bug/?i=1866`
[5] `http://jsslkeylog.sourceforge.net`

- Why: many applications (including Python) use OpenSSL.
- Problem: older OpenSSL versions have no key log callback.
- Solution: intercept library calls using a debugger or an interposing library (`LD_PRELOAD`) and dump keys[6].
- Example with OpenSSL 1.1.0f using an intercepting library[7]:

```
$ export SSLKEYLOGFILE=some.keys LD_PRELOAD=./libsslkeylog.so
$ curl https://example.com
...
$ cat some.keys
CLIENT_RANDOM 12E0F5085A89004291A679ABE8EE1508193878AB9E909745CA032212FCA24B89 148AF5875F83
```

[6] https://security.stackexchange.com/q/80158/2630
[7] https://git.lekensteyn.nl/peter/wireshark-notes/tree/src

- Windows native TLS library is Secure Channel (SChannel). Feature request for Microsoft Edge browser is pending[8].
- Extracting secrets from SChannel is not impossible (but neither easy) though[9].
- Apple macOS applications use SecureTransport, also not supported.

[8] https://wpdev.uservoice.com/forums/257854-microsoft-edge-developer/suggestions/16310230-ssl-key-logging-aka-sslkeylogfile

[9] https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Kambic-Cunning-With-CNG-Soliciting-Secrets-From-SChannel.pdf

- Force RSA key exchange (disable forward-secret cipher suites).
- Setup a fake CA and force traffic through a proxy like mitmproxy[10], OWASP Zap, Fiddler or Burp Suite.
- All of these methods can be detected by the client. Certificate pinning can also defeat the custom CA method.
- The proxy interception method may also weaken security[11].
- If you are really serious about a passive, nearly undetectable attack from a hypervisor, see the TeLeScope experiment[12].

[10] http://docs.mitmproxy.org/en/stable/dev/sslkeylogfile.html

[11] Durumeric et. al., The Security Impact of HTTPS Interception, https://jhalderm.com/pub/papers/interception-ndss17.pdf

[12] https://conference.hitb.org/hitbsecconf2016ams/sessions/telescope-peering-into-the-depths-of-tls-traffic-in-real-time/

- Display the contents of the decrypted application data.
- Right-click in the packet list or details view, *Follow* → *SSL Stream*.
- Great for text-based protocols like SMTP. For binary data, try the *Hex Dump* option.
- Click on data to jump to related packet (in packet list). Note that a display filter can hide packets, clear the filter to avoid that.



- After decryption is enabled, HTTP payloads within TLS (HTTPS) can be exported.
- *File* → *Export Objects* → *HTTP...*
- Click on an item to select it in the packet list.
- Note: does not cover HTTP/2 nor QUIC (yet?) as of Wireshark 2.6.



- Suppose you have a capture which is decrypted using a RSA private key file. How to allow others to decrypt data without handing over your RSA private key file?
- *File* → *Export SSL Session Keys...*
- Generates a key log file which can be used instead of the private RSA key file.
- Note: currently contains all keys. Remove lines which are not needed (match by the second field, the Random field from Client Hello).

- Display filters can be used for filtering, columns and coloring rules.
- Discover by selecting a field in packet list, look in status bar.
- Recognize TCP/TLS stream in packet list: Right-click *TCP Stream Index* (`tcp.stream`) field in packet details, *Apply as Column*.
- Right-click field in packet details, *Apply/Prepare as Filter*.
- SNI in Client Hello: `ssl.handshake.extensions_server_name`
- Change in Wireshark 2.4: `ssl.handshake.random` selects full Client or Server Random instead of the just the Random Bytes field. Reason: real time is often no longer included, full bytes field is useful for matching with key log file.

- Force dissector for custom ports. Decode as SSL (TCP) or DTLS (UDP).
- Select application data protocol within SSL/TLS layer (since Wireshark 2.4).
- Example: HTTPS on non-standard TCP server port 4433.
  - Right-click TCP layer, *Decode As*. Change current protocol for **TCP Port** to *SSL*.
  - Press *OK* to apply just for now or *Save* to persist this port-to-protocol mapping.
  - Right-click SSL layer, *Decode As*. Change current protocol for **SSL Port** to *HTTP*.
- For STARTTLS protocols, select SMTP/IMAP/... instead of SSL for *TCP Port*.
- Tip: there are many protocols, just select the field, then use arrow keys or type the protocol name (typing *H* gives *HTTP*).



- Tshark: command-line tool, useful to extract information as text, especially when the query is repeated multiple times.
- Find all cipher suites as selected by the server: `tshark -r some.pcap -Tfields -e ssl.handshake.ciphersuite -Y ssl.handshake.type==2`
- List all protocol fields: `tshark -G fields`
- Configure keylogfile:
  `tshark -ossl.keylog_file:firefox.keys -r firefox.pcapng.gz`
- Configure RSA keyfile (fields correspond to the RSA keys dialog):
  `tshark -ouat:ssl_keys:'"","","","keys/rsasnakeoil2.key",""'`
- Decode DNS-over-TLS[13] on non-standard port:
  `tshark -d tcp.port==53053,ssl -d ssl.port==53053,dns`
- Tshark manual: `https://www.wireshark.org/docs/man-pages/tshark.html`

[13] Sample: `https://lekensteyn.nl/files/captures/dns-tls-nonstandard-port.pcapng`

- Replaces all previous cipher suites with new one. Dropped all old cipher suites (no more CBC, RC4, NULL, export ciphers).
- RSA key exchange is gone, all ciphers are forward secret.
- Encrypted early (0-RTT) data.
- Encrypted server extensions (like ALPN).
- Encrypted server certificate.
- Multiple derived secrets for resumption, handshake encryption, application data encryption. (Safer resumption!)
- Decryption and dissection is supported by Wireshark (drafts 18-23 as of Wireshark 2.4.5, drafts 18-26 as of Wireshark 2.6).

- Out-of-Order TCP segments break dissection and decryption (*Ignored Unknown Record*). `https://bugs.wireshark.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=9461`
- Large certificates result in handshake fragmentation. Not displayed because reassembly for handshake messages is not implemented yet. `https://bugs.wireshark.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=3303`

- RSA private keys cannot be used for decryption in all cases.
- The key log method (`SSLKEYLOGFILE`) can also be used by clients and works with all cipher suites.
- TLS 1.3 debugging is even more difficult without decryption.
- Use latest Wireshark version, especially if you are doing any TLS 1.3 work.