

## SharkFest '18 Europe



# **Kerberos: An Introduction**

by looking at packets!

Eddi Blenkers

@PcapReader



### About me?



- 15+ years of network analysis
- Currently IT Security





#### **About Kerberos**



- Developed at MIT as part of the Athena project
- Offers authentication and authorization through a central server
- Widely used in Windows Domains
- UDP- and TCP-Port 88



## Acronyms and Vocabulary




- Client Principle = The users Account Name
- Server Principle = The service desired by the user
- SPN = Service Principal Name
- KDC = Key Distribution Center
   Usually your Domain Controller



#### **Authentication Process**







#### The Wireshark View



- AS-REQ = User presents password, gets TGT
- TGS-REQ = User presents TGT, gets Service
   Ticket

No.	^	Time	Source	Protocol	SNameString	CNameString	Info
	6516	747.622	10.20.20.20	KRB5	krbtgt,outerrim.local	darth.vader@outerrim.local	AS-REQ
	6517	747.641	10.1.1.2	KRB5	krbtgt,outerrim.local		KRB Error: KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED
	6524	747.671	10.20.20.20	KRB5	krbtgt,outerrim.local	darth.vader@outerrim.local	AS-REQ
	6526	747.691	10.1.1.2	KRB5	krbtgt,OUTERRIM.LOCAL	darth.vader	AS-REP
·	6535	747.712	10.20.20.20	KRB5	krbtgt,OUTERRIM.LOCAL,ho		TGS-REQ
	6539	747.731	10.1.1.2	KRB5	host, tiefighter.outerrim	darth.vader	TGS-REP
	6547	747.842	10.20.20.20	DCERPC			Bind: call_id: 3, Fragment: Single, 3 cont
	6548	747.861	10.1.1.2	DCFRPC			Rind ack: call id: 3 Fragment: Single ma



## Preauth Required?



- 1st AS-REQ should result in Preauth Required
- 2nd AS-REQ should be without error
- 2nd Request encrypts the current time with Password

No.	^	Time	Source	Protocol	SNameString	CNameString	Info
	6516	747.622	10.20.20.20	KRB5	krbtgt,outerrim.local	darth.vader@outerrim.local	AS-REQ
	6517	747.641	10.1.1.2	KRB5	krbtgt,outerrim.local		KRB Error: KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED
	6524	747.671	10.20.20.20	KRB5	krbtgt,outerrim.local	darth.vader@outerrim.local	AS-REQ
	6526	747.691	10.1.1.2	KRB5	krbtgt,OUTERRIM.LOCAL	darth.vader	AS-REP
	6535	747.712	10.20.20.20	KRB5	krbtgt,OUTERRIM.LOCAL,ho		TGS-REQ
	6539	747.731	10.1.1.2	KRB5	host, tiefighter.outerrim	darth.vader	TGS-REP
	6547	747.842	10.20.20.20	DCERPC			Bind: call_id: 3, Fragment: Single, 3 con
	6548	747.861	10.1.1.2	DCERPC			Bind ack: call id: 3, Fragment: Single, m



#### Service Tickets



Delivered in TGS-REP by the KDC

kvno: 1

TGS-REP is forwarded to desired service

etype: eTYPE-AES256-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96 (18)

```
7226 769,222 10,20,20,20
                                    krbtgt,OUTERRIM.LOCAL,ci...
                                                                            TGS-REQ
                            KRB5
7229 769,242 10,1,1,2
                            KRB5
                                   cifs, Tattoine
                                                               darth.vader TGS-REP
7232 769,242 10,20,20,20
                            SMB2
                                    cifs, Tattoine
                                                                            Session Setup Request
               sname
                    name-type: kRB5-NT-SRV-INST (2)
                   sname-string: 2 items
                     SNameString: cifs
                     SNameString: Tattoine
                enc-part
```

cipher: 397801138b1ea69335ded1034ba011605743f3fde80ad566...



## **Encryption Algorithms**



- Defined per GPO, avoid RC4 and DES
- Add AES for legacy systems after SW-Update

```
Info
             Source
                             Protocol
                                     SNameString
                                                                  CNameString
                                                                  darth.vader@outerrim.local AS-REQ
6516 747.622 10.20.20.20
                                     krbtgt,outerrim.local
                              KRB5
6517 747.641 10.1.1.2
                              KRB5
                                     krbtgt,outerrim.local
                                                                                                KRB Error: KRB5KDC ERR PREAUTH REQUIRED
6524 747,671 10,20,20,20
                             KRB5
                                     krbtgt,outerrim.local
                                                                  darth.vader@outerrim.local
                                                                                                AS-REO
6526 747,691 10,1,1,2
                              KRB5
                                     krbtgt,OUTERRIM.LOCAL
                                                                  darth.vader
                                                                                                AS-REP
6535 747.712 10.20.20.20
                              KRR5
                                     krhtgt OUTERRIM LOCAL ho
                                                                                                TGS-REO
```

v etype: 6 items

ENCTYPE: eTYPE-AES256-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96 (18) ENCTYPE: eTYPE-AES128-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96 (17)

ENCTYPE: eTYPE-ARCFOUR-HMAC-MD5 (23)
ENCTYPE: eTYPE-ARCFOUR-HMAC-MD5-56 (24)
ENCTYPE: eTYPE-ARCFOUR-HMAC-OLD-EXP (-135)

ENCTYPE: eTYPE-DES-CBC-MD5 (3)



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# **Analyzing Kerberos With Wireshark**

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## Message Type Numbers



Kerberos identifies each message type with a code number

No.	<b>Abbreviation</b>	Function
10	AS-REQ	Request Ticket-Granting Ticket
11	AS-REP	Ticket-Granting Ticket
12	TGS-REQ	Request Service Ticket
13	TGS-REP	Service Ticket
30	KRB-ERROR	error



## Kerberos Errors



- Kerberos traffic has a well-defined pattern:
  - AS-REQ followed by AS-REP
  - TGS-REG followed by TGS-REP
- In case of an error, AS-REP or TGS-REP is replaced by an error message



## Typical Errors



- Client Principal Unknown
  - → Username unknown
- Service Principal Unknown
  - → Service or Hostname unknown

No.	Time	Source	Protocol	CNameString	Info
7	6 2.540	10.20.20.20	KRB5	Kendal.Ozzel@outerrim.local	AS-REQ
7	7 2.558	10.1.1.1	KRB5		KRB Error: KRB5KDC_ERR C PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN



## Kerberos Display Filter



Kerberos messages, including authentication to applications:

kerberos

 Only Kerberos messages, but exclude routine messages kerberos
 and (tcp.port == 88 or udp.port == 88)
 and not kerberos.msg\_type in {10 11 12 13}



## Response Too Big



- Kerberos over UDP has a size limit
- Response too big forces the connection to TCP

```
Filter: (tcp.port == 88 or udp.port == 88)
                                            ▼ Expression... Clear Apply
     Time
               Source
                          Destination
                                      Info
  77 46.833
               10.1.0.1
                          10.0.0.2
                                     AS-REO
  78 46.834
               10.0.0.2
                          10.1.0.1
                                     KRB Error: KRB5KRB_ERR_RESPONSE_TOO_BIG
  79 46.834
               10.1.0.1
                        10.0.0.2
                                      1037 > 88 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460
  80 46.834
               10.0.0.2
                        10.1.0.1
                                      88 > 1037 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=8192 Len=0 MSS=1460
  81 46.835
              10.1.0.1
                        10.0.0.2
                                     1037 > 88 [ACK] Seg=1 Ack=1 Win=65535 Len=0
  82 46.835
              10.1.0.1
                        10.0.0.2
                                     AS-REQ
  83 46.836
              10.0.0.2
                        10.1.0.1
                                     AS-REP
                                     1037 > 88 [FIN, ACK] Seq=307 Ack=1438 Win=64098 Len=0
  84 46.836
              10.1.0.1
                         10.0.0.2
  85 46.836
              10.0.0.2
                         10.1.0.1
                                      88 > 1037 [ACK] Seq=1438 Ack=308 Win=64240 Len=0
  86 46.836
                                      88 > 1037 [RST, ACK] Seg=1438 Ack=308 Win=0 Len=0
              10.0.0.2
  87 46.838
               10.1.0.1
                          10.0.0.2
                                      TGS-REO
  88 46.839
               10.0.0.2
                          10.1.0.1
                                      TGS-REP
```



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# **Kerberos Advanced Topics**

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### Use Case: New File Server



- Like all computers, file servers are replaced
- If they get a new name, all shares have to be remapped: Scripts, Links etc.
- DNS Alias (CNAME) allow an easy migration
- Really?



## It works, does it?



No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length Info
	1 0.000	10.20.20.20	10.1.1.1	DNS	80 Standard query 0x85ea A yavin.outerrim.local
	2 0.012	10.1.1.1	10.20.20.20	DNS	115 Standard query response 0x85ea A yavin.outerrim.local CNAME hoth.outerrim.local A 10.1.1.3
_		_			:64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
	ンハに	' Loca	ate Se	2r\/4	ers IP Adress Ack=1 Win=8192 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
<b> </b>		. LUCC		-I V \	:1 Win=65536 Len=0
	6 0.032	10.20.20.20	10.1.1.3	SMB	213 Negotiate Protocol Request
	7 0.052	10.1.1.3	10.20.20.20	SMB2	306 Negotiate Protocol Response
	8 0.052	10.20.20.20	10.1.1.3	SMB2	232 Negotiate Protocol Request
	9 0.072	10.1.1.3	10.20.20.20	SMB2	366 Negotiate Protocol Response
					→ 88 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
F	-ctal	olish S	SMR	$\mathbb{Z}_{\Delta^{C}}$	3457 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=8192 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM=1
L	_Stal	UIIOII .	י טויוכ	762	88 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=65536 Len=0
	13 0.092	10.20.20.20	10.1.1.2	KKBD	נאס ועס-גבע
	14 0.112	10.1.1.2	10.20.20.20	TCP	60 88 → 56457 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1626 Win=65536 Len=0
	15 0.112	10.1.1.2	10.20.20.20	KRB5	161 KRB Error: KRB5KDC ERR S PRINCIPAL UNKNOWN
	* A A D	<b>C</b>			3 Win=65536 Len=0
	MK	Sessi	on w	Ork	S. User is happy. 65536 Len=0
	, 1D				Win=0 Len=0
	19 0.212	10.20.20.20	10.1.1.3	SMB2	220 Session Setup Request, NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE
	20 0.232	10.1.1.3	10.20.20.20	SMB2	387 Session Setup Response, Error: STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED, NTLMSSP_CHALLENGE
	21 0.233	10.20.20.20	10.1.1.3	SMB2	701 Session Setup Request, NTLMSSP_AUTH, User: OUTERRIM\drk-1
	22 0.262	10.1.1.3	10.20.20.20	SMB2	159 Session Setup Response
	23 0.263	10.20.20.20	10.1.1.3	SMB2	184 Tree Connect Request Tree: \\yavin.outerrim.local\IPC\$
	24 0.282	10.1.1.3	10.20.20.20	SMB2	138 Tree Connect Response
	25 0.282	10.20.20.20	10.1.1.3	SMB2	178
	26 0 202	10 20 20 20	10 1 1 2	CMDO	100 Charta Barriagt Filas Akarra



SNameString: yavin.outerrim.local

### What really happens ...



```
Destination
                                   Protocol
                                            80 Standard query 0x85ea A yavin.outerrim.local
 1 0.000 10.20.20.20
                      10.1.1.1
                                   DNS
                                           115 Standard query response 0x85ea A yavin.outerrim.local CNAME hoth.outerrim.local A 10.1.1.3
 2 0.012 10.1.1.1
                      10.20.20.20 DNS
 3 0.014 10.20.20.20 10.1.1.3
                                   TCP
                                            66 56456 → 445 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK PERM=1
 4 0.032 10.1.1.3
                      10,20,20,20
                                            66 445 → 56456 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=8192 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK PERM=1
                                   TCP
 5 0.032 10.20.20.20
                      10.1.1.3
                                            60 56456 → 445 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=65536 Len=0
                                   TCP
 6 0.032 10.20.20.20 10.1.1.3
                                   SMB
                                           213 Negotiate Protocol Request
                                           306 Negotiate Protocol Response
 7 0.052 10.1.1.3
                      10.20.20.20 SMB2
 8 0.052 10.20.20.20 10.1.1.3
                                   SMB2
                                           232 Negotiate Protocol Request
 9 0.072 10.1.1.3
                                           366 Negotiate Protocol Response
                      10.20.20.20 SMB2
10 0.073 10.20.20.20 10.1.1.2
                                           66 56457 → 88 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK PERM=1
                                   TCP
11 0.092 10.1.1.2
                      10.20.20.20 TCP
                                            66 88 → 56457 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=8192 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK PERM=1
12 0.092 10.20.20.20
                      10.1.1.2
                                            60 56457 → 88 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=65536 Len=0
                                   TCP
                                          1679 TGS-REO
                                   KRB5
13 0.092 10.20.20.20 10.1.1.2
                                            60 88 → 56457 [ACK] Seg=1 Ack=1626 Win=65536 Len=0
14 0.112 10.1.1.2
                      10.20.20.20 TCP
                                           161 KRB Error: KRB5KDC ERR S PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN
15 0.112 10.1.1.2
                      10.20.20.20 KRB5
      SNameString: cifs
```



#### ... could be more secure



).	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
	19 0.212	10.20.20.20	10.1.1.3	SMB2	220	Session Setup Request, NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE
/	20 0.232	10.1.1.3	10.20.20.20	SMB2	387	Session Setup Response, Error: STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED, NTLMSSP_CHALLENGE
	21 0.233	10.20.20.20	10.1.1.3	SMB2	701	Session Setup Request, NTLMSSP_AUTH, User: OUTERRIM\drk-1
	22 0.262	10.1.1.3	10.20.20.20	SMB2	159	Session Setup Response
	23 0.263	10.20.20.20	10.1.1.3	SMB2	184	<pre>Tree Connect Request Tree: \\yavin.outerrim.local\IPC\$</pre>
	24 0.282	10.1.1.3	10.20.20.20	SMB2	138	Tree Connect Response

NTLM Secure Service Provider

NTLMSSP identifier: NTLMSSP

NTLM Message Type: NTLMSSP AUTH (0x00000003)

LMv2 Client Challenge: 00000000000000000

NTLM Response: 56b76966c6bd9cb91e4875078267d97401010

Length: 340 Maxlen: 340 Offset: 158

Man-in-the-Middle attack

NTLMv2 Response: 56b76966c6bd9cb91e4875078267d97401010000000000000...

NTProofStr: 56b76966c6bd9cb91e4875078267d974

Response Version: 1 Hi Response Version: 1

7: 0000000000000

Time: Oct 31, 2018 13:42:24.975148200 UTC NTLMv2 Client Challenge: Ofacebcaafb150f3

#sf18eu • Imperial Riding School Renaissance Vienna • Oct 29 - Nov 2



#### Solution



Run this command on the target computer:

C:\> netdom computername hoth.outerrim.local
 /add:yavin.outerrim.local

#### Verify the results:

C:\> netdom computername hoth /enum



## Delegation



- Kerberos tickets can be forwarded from a frontend server to a backend system
- Classic Example:
   Webserver forwards ticket to an SQL server
   → This is called "delegation"
- S4U2P = Service for User to Proxy
   Constrained or Unconstrained Delegation



## Delegation



- Not for users in the group "Protected Users"
- Can be unconstrained or constrained
- Constrained delegation limits services who can forward tickets or process forwarded tickets



#### The Wireshark View



```
Filter: kerberos and (tcp.port == 88 or udp.port == 88)
                                               ▼ Expression... Clear Apply
     Time
                Source
                            Destination
                                        Info
 426 37.039
               10.0.0.2
                           10.0.100.2 TGS-REP
                                        TGS-REO
                                        KRB Error: KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION NT Status: STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED
               10.0.100.210.0.0.2
 463 37.058
                                        TGS-REQ
 466 37.062
                10.0.0.2 10.0.100.2 TGS-REP
■ Kerberos TGS-REQ

    ⊞ Record Mark: 2337 bytes

   Pyno: 5
   MSG Type: TGS-REQ (12)

■ padata: PA-TGS-REQ

 ■ KDC_REQ_BODY
     Padding: 0

■ KDCOptions: 40830000 (Forwardable, Renewable, Constrained Delegation, Canonicalize)

     Realm: TEST.DE

■ Server Name (Enterprise Name): pc-hq-win7$@TEST.DE
```



## Website Worth a Bookmark



- Noteworthy blog from Will "harmj0y" Schroeder
- https://posts.specterops.io/another-word-ondelegation-10bdbe3cd94a



## SharkFest '18 Europe



### Tales from the Mos Eisley Cantina Episode 1: The Bloated Ticket

Eddi Blenkers


@PcapReader



### Beware of Large Tickets



- Tickets should be max. 48.000 Byte
- Users should be a member in max.
   1.015 groups





## Odd on the Command Line



C:\> net user grand-moff.tarkin /domain
System error 1783 has occurred.


The stub received bad data.

•••



#### Odd in the GUI







#### **Kerberos Parameters**



- HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet \Control\Lsa\Kerberos\Parameters
- Value name: MaxTokenSize

Data type: **REG\_DWORD** 

Radix: **Decimal** 

Value data: **48000** 





## SharkFest '18 Europe



# Tales from the Mos Eisley Cantina Episode 2: Infiltrating a Network

Eddi Blenkers

@PcapReader



#### The Command Line



```
C:\> net use \\hoth.outerrim.local\c$
   /user:Kendal.Ozzel@outerrim.local abc
```

System error 86 has occurred.

The specified network password is not correct.



#### The Wireshark View



 Diffferent Return Codes for wrong password or for non-existing users

No.	^	Time	Source	Protocol	CNameString	Info
	76	2.540	10.20.20.20	KRB5	Kendal.Ozzel@outerrim.local	AS-REQ
	77	2.558	10.1.1.1	KRB5		KRB Error: KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN
	92	2.799	10.20.20.20	KRB5	Moradmin.Bast@outerrim.local	AS-REQ
	93	2.818	10.1.1.1	KRB5		KRB Error: KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN
	116	3.199	10.20.20.20	KRB5	Tiaan.Jerjerrod@outerrim.local	AS-REQ
	117	3.218	10.1.1.1	KRB5		KRB Error: KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED
	124	3.238	10.20.20.20	KRB5	Tiaan.Jerjerrod@outerrim.local	AS-REQ
	125	3.258	10.1.1.1	KRB5		KRB Error: KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED
	148	3.628	10.20.20.20	KRB5	Gial.Ackbar@outerrim.local	AS-REQ
	149	3.648	10.1.1.1	KRB5		KRB Error: KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN
	180	4.048	10.20.20.20	KRB5	Cassian.Andor@outerrim.local	AS-REQ
	181	4.068	10.1.1.1	KRB5		KRB Error: KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN



## SharkFest '18 Europe



# Tales from the Mos Eisley Cantina Episode 3: Kerberoast

More Network Intfiltration

Eddi Blenkers

@PcapReader



#### Kerberoast



- Powershell script that requests all available service tickets from a domain
- Output from the Powershell script can be processed by "John the Ripper" to reveal the password for the service account



#### The Wireshark View



- Watch out for a large number of service requests in quick succession
- Especially interesting if coming from an usual source

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	CNameString	SNameString	Info
1728	22.069	10.20.20.20	10.1.1.2	KRB5		krbtgt,OUTERRIM.LOCAL,HTTP,kashyyyk.outerrim.local	TGS-REQ
1742	22.089	10.1.1.2	10.20.20.20	KRB5	darth.vader	HTTP,kashyyyk.outerrim.local	TGS-REP
1750	22.129	10.20.20.20	10.1.1.2	KRB5		krbtgt,OUTERRIM.LOCAL,SQL,coruscant.outerrim.local	TGS-REQ
1757	22.149	10.1.1.2	10.20.20.20	KRB5	darth.vader	SQL,coruscant.outerrim.local	TGS-REP
1765	22.259	10.20.20.20	10.1.1.2	KRB5		krbtgt,OUTERRIM.LOCAL,SWINVENTORY,hoth.outerrim.local	TGS-REQ
1768	22.279	10.1.1.2	10.20.20.20	KRB5	darth.vader	SWINVENTORY,hoth.outerrim.local	TGS-REP



## SharkFest '18 Europe



# Tales from the Mos Eisley Cantina Episode 4: Golden & Silver Ticket

Eddi Blenkers

@PcapReader



### Golden Tickets



- The "Golden Ticket" is a forged TGT
- Allows requesting tickets for all services
- Requires privileged access to a DC
- Use mimikatz
  - Obtain the password hash for the account krbtgt
  - Use this hash to forge a TGT
  - The KDC will not notice, that it didn't issue this TGT



## Visibility in Wireshark



- Interesting things happen in memory, not on the network
- Not really a case for Wireshark



### Silver Tickets



- Requires knowledge of the password for a service account (Remember Kerberoast?)
- Use the password to forge a service ticket



## Visibility in Wireshark



- Again, interesting things happen in memory.
- The service tickets just happen to be there.
- You might notice the ticket being presented without a TGS-REQ.
  - The ticket could be cached from an earlier request.
  - A full capture from the workstation should reveal a backdoor and other attacker activities.



#### More on Golden Tickets



One of many articles on the web:

https://digital-forensics.sans.org/blog/2014/11/24/

kerberos-in-the-crosshairs-golden-tickets-silver-

tickets-mitm-more



## SharkFest '18 Europe



# **Kerberos More Advanced Topics**

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
## Privilege Account Certificate



- Allows the Server to verify if a ticket has been tampered with.
- Only checked if ...
  - application has the SeTcbPrivilege privilege "Act as part of the operating system"
  - application is a service
  - Kerberos config doesn't prevent PAC check









#### PAC



 https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/ openspecification/2009/04/24/ understanding-microsoftkerberos-pac-validation/







# Questions?