



Everything is encrypted

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Let me introduce myself

SharkFest'24 EUROPE
Vienna, Austria • #sf24eu



- I am André Luyer
- I use Wireshark and network captures to analyze applications
- And these are my socials:
  @AndreLuyer



Rabobank




Wireshark Users NL
Meetup






Why would you want to analyze encrypted traffic?

- Production issue: find root cause fast
 - And setting up capture session keys or decrypted traffic takes time
- Snapped packets
- Start not captured
- Decryption not allowed
- Decryption fails








- IP protocol
 - Source and destination address
 - Capture DNS as well
- TCP
 - Port numbers – can be a clue to top level protocol used
 - Payload size (`tcp.len`)
 - RTT (`tcp.analysis.initial_rtt`)
 - Timing!
 - Maximum Segment Size (MSS) for “full packets”
 - Push flag (`tcp.flags.push`)
 - Who closes / aborts the connection
- TLS
 - Handshake not encrypted ($\leq v1.2$)
 - Handshake partially not encrypted (v1.3)

Typical application flow – half duplex – TCP

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Example of how to calculate application turns:

```
tshark -r $file -Tfields -e tcp.stream -e frame.number -e ip.src  
-Y 'tls.record.content_type==23 || tls.record.opaque_type' |  
sort -k1,1n -k2,2n |  
awk -F '\t' 'function mprint() { print nr, turns/2 }'  
BEGIN { nr=-1 }  
$1 != nr { if (nr > 0) mprint(); turns=0; nr = $1; dir="" }  
{ if ($3 != dir) { turns++; dir=$3 } }  
END { mprint() }'
```

Filter on Application Data and count direction switches



Tip: Use your own traffic as reference

- Wireshark Tools menu / TLS Keylog Launcher
- SSLKEYLOGFILE
 - Handled by encryption library (OpenSSL, GnuTLS, BoringSSL, ...)
 - Also server side (jsslkeylog for Java (e.g. Tomcat), Nginx, ...)
 - Not Windows Schannel
- Developer tool in browser
- chrome://net-export
- Application debug logging (e.g. Java -Djavax.net.debug=all)



TLS version ≤ 1.2



- Different record types clearly visible:

Type	<code>tls.record.content_type (dec)</code>
Handshake	22
Change Cipher Spec (start encryption)	20
Application Data	23
Alert (Close Notify)	21

- Simply filter on `tls.record.content_type == 23` for records that contain payload
 - But `tls.record.length` is not payload size



Information from Client Hello:

- Supported versions
 - Min version = `tls.record.version`
 - Max version = `tls.handshake.version`
 - If Client supports v1.3 then use Supported Versions extension instead
- Supported Cipher Suites (`tls.handshake.ciphersuite`)
- Extensions – thus optional!!
 - Server Name Indication (SNI) (`tls.handshake.extensions_server_name`)
 - Next protocol: Application Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN)
(`tls.handshake.extensions_alpn_str`)
- FA3/FA4 Fingerprints (`tls.handshake.ja3 ...4`)
 - Cipher Suites list and order to identify browsers



Information from Server Hello:

- Selected version (`tls.handshake.version`)
 - TLS 1.1 was **deprecated** in 2021
- Selected Cipher Suite (`tls.handshake.ciphersuite`)
- Extension – thus optional
 - Selected next protocol: Application Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) (`tls.handshake.extensions_alpn_str`)
- FA3/FA4 Fingerprints (`tls.handshake.ja3s ...4s`)



- Certificate(s) are also send in clear text.
 - Thus also easy to export
- Useful information from certificates:
 - Host name(s) (x509ce.dNSName)
 - Common name (x509if.RelativeDistinguishedName_item_element)
 - Validity; not before & not after (x509af.notAfter)
- Mutual TLS? Then also client certificate
- Not available when resumed



- Application Data, how to determine real payload size

Application Data record	Remark
header payload MAC padding	
header IV payload MAC padding	Since 1.1 and block cipher in CBC mode
header nonce payload	Since 1.2 and AEAD cipher

- Header: type (1 byte) + version (2 bytes) + length (2 bytes)
- Total Appl Data record size is `tls.record.length + 5`
- Shortcut: lookup length of TLS Alert
It has a fixed ‘payload’ length of 2 bytes
- Actual size of overhead may vary due to padding (rounding to block size)
 - Small error in size acceptable when looking at patterns or doing statistics



- A TLS Alert (Close Notify) is always last record per direction and is small in size
 - Followed by TCP-FIN or TCP-Reset
 - Alert during handshake is not encrypted
-
- Calculations:
 $\text{overhead} = \text{alert(tls.record.length)} - 2$
 - Payload size in Application Data:
 $\text{Payload size} \approx \text{tls.record.length} - \text{overhead}$
 - Question is this ok too?
 $\text{Payload size} \approx \text{tcp.len} - 5 - \text{overhead}$



Example of how to calculate overhead ratio:

```
tshark -r $myfile -Y tcp.port==443 -T fields -e tcp.len  
-e tls.record.content_type -e tls.record.length |  
awk '{ total += $1; split($2, arr, ","); split($3, lens, ",");  
for (tp in arr) if (arr[tp] == "23") payload += lens[tp] - 24 }  
END { overhead = total - payload; printf "%6d payload\n%6d  
%6.3g%% overhead\n", payload, overhead, overhead/total * 100 }'
```

Total = sum(tcp.len)

Payload = sum(tls.record.length - 24) for each Application Data



TLS version 1.3



- Some record type are not encrypted

Handshake Types:

- Client Hello
- Hello Retry Request
- Server Hello
- Change Cipher Spec (start encryption)

- Finished record is encrypted, send in both directions, small in size
- Display filter `tls.record.opaque_type` (== 23) present



Information from Client Hello:

- Supported versions
 - Min version = `min(tls.handshake.extensions.supported_version)`
 - Max version = `max(tls.handshake.extensions.supported_version)`
- For backwards compatibility:
 - `tls.record.version` = TLS v1.0
 - `tls.handshake.version` = TLS v1.2
- Supported Cipher Suites (`tls.handshake.ciphersuite`)
- Extensions – thus optional!!
 - Server Name Indication (SNI) (`tls.handshake.extensions_server_name`)
 - Next protocol: Application Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN)
(`tls.handshake.extensions_alpn_str`)
 - Early Data (`tls.handshake.extension.type == 42`)



Information from Server Hello and Hello Retry Request:

- Selected version (`tls.handshake.extensions.supported_version`)
 - Thus TLS 1.3...
 - `tls.record.version` and `tls.handshake.version` no longer used
- Selected Cipher Suite (`tls.handshake.ciphersuite`)



When handshake complete and start first real Application Data

- Last handshake message Finished is encrypted (and small in size)
- Optionally followed by Session ticket(s)
 - Always send by server
 - When captured at client side, it may arrive after sending first request
- First real Application Data from client (most cases)



- A TLS Alert (Close Notify) is always last record per direction and is small in size
- Followed by TCP-FIN or TCP-Reset
- Calculations:
 $\text{overhead} = \text{tls.record.length} - 2$
- Payload size in Application Data:
 $\text{Payload size} \approx \text{tls.record.length} - \text{overhead}$



- Client Hello contains Early Data extension
- Flow:
 - Client Hello
 - Change Cipher Spec, Application Data
 - Server Hello, etc...
 - End of Early Data
- Session ticket needed
- No forward secrecy (don't send sensitive data)
- HTTP 425 Too Early
- Never used in back-end calls (APIs)



- Even when encrypted some possible causes can be ruled out
 - Helps to narrow search for root cause
- Or point to the possible cause
- Most timing issues can also be seen at TCP level
- If TLS Handshake successful, then not “network problem”
- Use ‘own decrypted’ traffic as reference
- At least: figure out where in the network path the traffic needs to be decrypted for further analysis

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No.	Time	Delta time	Source	Destination	Src Port	Dst Port	Protocol	Stream	Length	TCP Len	TLS Len	HTTP	ALPN	Info
4	13:25:29.273765	0.000015000	10.246.64.16	10.239.207.93	55904	20351	TLSv1.2	0	417	351	346		Client Hello (SNI=SharkFest-demo-500.testsel)	

- Delta time: `tcp.time_delta or udp.time_delta`
 - Stream: `tcp.stream`
 - TCP Len: `tcp.len`
 - TLS Len: `tls.record.length`
 - HTTP len: `len(http)`
 - ALPN: `tls.handshake.extensions_alpn_str`
- Buttons:
- TLS: `tls`
 - TCP Stream: `tcp.stream == ${tcp.stream}`



- Overview: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Resources_and_specifications
- HTTP: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9110>
- HTTP/2: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9113>
- HTTP/3: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9114>
- TLS 1.2: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5246>
- TLS 1.3: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8446>
- TCP: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9293> (First RFC 793 September 1981)
- IP: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc791> (First RFC 760 January 1980)
- DNS: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc1035> (First RFC 882 November 1983)
- First RFC: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc1> 7 April 1969
- History: <https://www.computerhistory.org/internethistory/>