


DNS-Security

Johannes Weber
SVA System Vertrieb Alexander GmbH



- Johannes Weber
- SVA System Vertrieb Alexander GmbH
- Master IT-Security
- Network Security Consultant
- IPv6 & DNS
- LinkedIn: <https://www.linkedin.com/in/johannes-webernetz/>
- Blog: <https://weberblog.net/>


- Malicious DNS
 - Malware & DNS
 - Look-Alike Domains
 - DGAs
 - DNS-Exfiltration
 - DNS-Tunneling
- DNS Spoofing
- DNSSEC
- DoT & DoH
- Attacks & Defenses
- Tools
- Normally a 1-day course

- Privacy: use own recursive resolvers
- Don't use 8.8.8.8 at all



Malware & DNS



- 90 % of malware use DNS
- to find HTTPS servers to download executables
- C2 traffic, command-and-control
- „kill switch“
- **Defense**: known-malicious feeds, DNS blocklist, RPZ
- → clients get an NXDOMAIN or sinkhole address


- phishing mails
- paypal.com paypal.com
- paypał.com paypaI.com

- gmial.com

- **Defense**: known-malicious feeds, DNS blocklist, RPZ
- → clients get an NXDOMAIN or sinkhole address


- millions of pseudo-random names
 - `exxkosgrtkidfhlibffoi.com`
 - `kbucdfkqpeksffoikkgb.com`
-
- or even better: dictionary-based names
 - `legoutlineactually.net`
 - `packageflyexcept.com`

- DNS blocklists are not working (too many entries)
- Millions of domains are registered per day → most of them are malicious!
- → We assume that all new domains are malicious until we verified they're not
- **Defense**: „newly registered | observed domains“ feeds



- Live-Demo:
`tcpdump -i ens6 port 53 | grep .weberlab.de`

DNS-Tunneling




- DNS-Exfiltration:
 - **DNSteal**: <https://github.com/m57/dnsteal>
 - **dns-exfil**: <https://github.com/rybolov/dns-exfil>
- DNS-Tunneling:
 - **iodine**: <https://github.com/yarrick/iodine>
 - **dnscat2**: <https://github.com/iagox86/dnscat2>


```
weberjoh@nb15-lx:~$ sudo iodine -f -P passphrase -r 85.22.58.63 io.weberlab.de
Opened dns0
Opened IPv4 UDP socket
Sending DNS queries for io.weberlab.de to 85.22.58.63
Autodetecting DNS query type (use -T to override).
Using DNS type NULL queries
Version ok, both using protocol v 0x00000502. You are user #0
Setting IP of dns0 to 192.168.99.2
Setting MTU of dns0 to 1130
Server tunnel IP is 192.168.99.1
Skipping raw mode
Using EDNS0 extension
Switching upstream to codec Base128
Server switched upstream to codec Base128
No alternative downstream codec available, using default (Raw)
Switching to lazy mode for low-latency
Server switched to lazy mode
Autoprobing max downstream fragment size... (skip with -m fragsize)
768 ok.. ...1152 not ok.. ...960 not ok.. 864 ok.. 912 ok.. 936 ok.. ...948 not
ok.. will use 936-2=934
Setting downstream fragment size to max 934...
Connection setup complete, transmitting data.
```


- **Defense:** Deep Query Inspection
 - Length of labels
 - Lexical analysis
 - Entropy of labels
 - Frequency
 - Total number of queries
 - Size of queries/responses


Where to leverage DNS-Security? On-Prem



License on segmentation firewall?
With or without cloud?!?



Where to leverage DNS-Security? Road Warrior




- Secure DNS resolver
- Via agent, full-tunnel VPN, proxy, #SASE #SSE

DNS Spoofing




DNS Spoofing / Cache Poisoning



- UDP 53 <- easy to spoof
- MITM at layer 3
 - ARP-/NDP-spoofing
 - BGP hijacking
 - (root) access on a router
- (root) access on a resolver
- middleware like firewalls
- censoring states (packet drop is possible anyway)
- Defense: DNSSEC

- Fooling recursive resolver to store falsified RRs in its cache
- Attacker asks `something01.mybank.com A?`
- Attacker guesses source port & query ID
`something01.mybank.com NS www.mybank.com`

`;;; ADDITIONAL SECTION`
`www.mybank.com 86400 IN A 192.0.2.66`
- **Defense:** DNSSEC




- Authenticity & integrity
- NOT: confidentiality!
- DNSKEY: KSK, ZSK
- DS signed in parent zone
- RRSIG

weberdns.de. 3600 IN **A 87.106.163.167**

weberdns.de. 3600 IN **RRSIG A 13 2 3600 (**
20251105201251 20251022193302 2774 weberdns.de.
Ud5Fi3p+X+sG6jz/2PcCR8F10EZzoYxuPGMb4bWjCsZ+
HkCPjUR1t5LI5kmcfi7VQPfJnDAK6x2x2WXzVAGdIA==)

<https://dnsviz.net/d/weberdns.de/dnssec/>



```
weberjoh@nuc:~$ dig weberdns.de
```

```
; <<>> DiG 9.18.39-0ubuntu0.22.04.2-Ubuntu <<>> weberdns.de
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 40761
;; flags: qr rd ra ad; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1

;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 1232
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;weberdns.de.                IN      A

;; ANSWER SECTION:
weberdns.de.                 3600    IN      A      87.106.163.167

;; Query time: 3 msec
;; SERVER: 127.0.0.1#53(127.0.0.1) (UDP)
;; WHEN: Fri Oct 24 10:52:55 CEST 2025
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 56
```

```
weberjoh@nuc:~$ dig weberdns.de +dnssec
```

```
; <<>> DiG 9.18.39-0ubuntu0.22.04.2-Ubuntu <<>> weberdns.de +dnssec
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 34320
;; flags: qr rd ra ad; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 2, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1

;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags: do; udp: 1232
;; QUESTION SECTION:
weberdns.de.                IN      A


;; ANSWER SECTION:
weberdns.de.                3592    IN      A      87.106.163.167
weberdns.de.                3592    IN      RRSIG   A 13 2 3600 20251105201251
20251022193302 2774 weberdns.de.
Ud5Fi3p+X+sG6jz/2PcCR8F10EZzoYxuPGMb4bWjCsZ+HkCPjUR1t5LI
5kmcfi7VQPfJnDAK6x2x2WXzVAGdIA==


;; Query time: 0 msec
;; SERVER: 127.0.0.1#53(127.0.0.1) (UDP)
;; WHEN: Fri Oct 24 10:53:03 CEST 2025
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 163
```

- DNSSEC validation normally on resolvers, not clients
- DNSSEC-Validation: Client-Side
- <http://www.dnssec-or-not.com/>
- <https://wander.science/projects/dns/dnssec-resolver-test/>
- Caution: Attackers will sign their zones as well ☹️
- <https://weberblog.net/dns/>

DoT
&
DoH









- Confidentiality!
- DoT, DNS-over-TLS: `tcp.port eq 853`
 - Encryption between **OS** <-> **Resolver**
- DoH, DNS-over-HTTPS: `tcp.port eq 443`
 - Encryption between **App (Browser)** <-> **Resolver**
 - Encryption between **OS** <-> **Resolver**

```
curl -H 'accept: application/dns-json' 'https://cloudflare-dns.com/dns-query?name=example.com&type=A' | jq .
```

```
curl -H 'accept: application/dns-message' 'https://dns.google/dns-query?dns=q80BAAABAAAAAAAAAAAA3d3dwdleGFtcGx1A2NvbQAAAQAB' | hexdump -c
```



- DoH might circumvent internal DNS security!



- Best Practise: Blocking of DoH on firewalls / Disabling DoH through group policies
- Offer DoH on your resolver

- <https://www.joindns4.eu/>
- Protect yourself -> Protective resolution

Protective resolution

IP address:

86.54.11.1 

86.54.11.201 

IPv6:

2a13:1001::86:54:11:1 

2a13:1001::86:54:11:201 

DNS over HTTPS:

[https://protective.joindns4.eu/
dns-query](https://protective.joindns4.eu/dns-query) 

DNS over TLS:

protective.joindns4.eu 

```
dig @protective.joindns4.eu +tls heise.de  
dig @protective.joindns4.eu +https heise.de
```

- DNSDiag: <https://dnsdiag.org/>

```
./dnsping.py --server 2a13:1001::86:54:11:1 heise.de
```

```
./dnsping.py --server protective.joindns4.eu --tls heise.de
```

```
./dnsping.py --server protective.joindns4.eu --doh heise.de
```

- Ultimate PCAP: <https://weberblog.net/the-ultimate-pcap/>



dot-doh-doh3.pcap [UbuntuDockerGuest-4 eth0 to R2 FastEthernet1/0]

File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Wireless Tools Help



tcp.port eq 853

TCP.Str > UDP.Str > DNS > RS/RA/DHCPv6

No.	Time Delta	Source	Destination	Protocol	Src Port	Dst Port	TCP.Str	UDP.Str	DNS Qry or Host or SNI	Info
50		2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	2a13:1001::86:54:11:201	TCP	46156	853	4			46156 → 853 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64800 Len=0 MSS=
51	0.000845	2a13:1001::86:54:11:201	2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	TCP	853	46156	4			853 → 46156 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=64260
52	0.000021	2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	2a13:1001::86:54:11:201	TCP	46156	853	4			46156 → 853 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=64896 Len=
53	0.000250	2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	2a13:1001::86:54:11:201	TLSv1.3	46156	853	4		protective.joindns4.eu	Client Hello (SNI=protective.joindns4.eu)
54	0.011743	2a13:1001::86:54:11:201	2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	TCP	853	46156	4			853 → 46156 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=518 Win=64128 Le
55	0.000381	2a13:1001::86:54:11:201	2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	TLSv1.3	853	46156	4			Server Hello, Change Cipher Spec
56	0.000013	2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	2a13:1001::86:54:11:201	TCP	46156	853	4			46156 → 853 [ACK] Seq=518 Ack=134 Win=64768
57	0.000117	2a13:1001::86:54:11:201	2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	TLSv1.3	853	46156	4			Application Data
58	0.000006	2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	2a13:1001::86:54:11:201	TCP	46156	853	4			46156 → 853 [ACK] Seq=518 Ack=1562 Win=67712
59	0.000063	2a13:1001::86:54:11:201	2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	TLSv1.3	853	46156	4			Application Data, Application Data, Applicat
60	0.000000	2a13:1001::86:54:11:201	2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	TLSv1.3	853	46156	4			Application Data, Application Data
61	0.000006	2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	2a13:1001::86:54:11:201	TCP	46156	853	4			46156 → 853 [ACK] Seq=518 Ack=2627 Win=70528
62	0.000004	2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	2a13:1001::86:54:11:201	TCP	46156	853	4			46156 → 853 [ACK] Seq=518 Ack=3173 Win=73344
63	0.002651	2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	2a13:1001::86:54:11:201	TLSv1.3	46156	853	4			Change Cipher Spec, Application Data
64	0.049800	2a13:1001::86:54:11:201	2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	TCP	853	46156	4			853 → 46156 [ACK] Seq=3173 Ack=598 Win=64128
65	0.000016	2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	2a13:1001::86:54:11:201	TLSv1.3	46156	853	4			Application Data
66	0.010950	2a13:1001::86:54:11:201	2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	TCP	853	46156	4			853 → 46156 [ACK] Seq=3173 Ack=648 Win=64128
67	0.000111	2a13:1001::86:54:11:201	2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	TLSv1.3	853	46156	4			Application Data
68	0.000455	2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	2a13:1001::86:54:11:201	TCP	46156	853	4			46156 → 853 [FIN, ACK] Seq=648 Ack=3239 Win=
69	0.011370	2a13:1001::86:54:11:201	2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	TCP	853	46156	4			853 → 46156 [FIN, ACK] Seq=3239 Ack=649 Win=
70	0.000020	2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	2a13:1001::86:54:11:201	TCP	46156	853	4			46156 → 853 [ACK] Seq=649 Ack=3240 Win=73344

Frame 53: Packet, 603 bytes on wire (4824 bits), 603 bytes captured (4824 bits)
Ethernet II, Src: EliteGroupCo_0f:cc:5e (1c:69:7a:0f:cc:5e), Dst: PaloAltoNetw_03:12:12 (3c:fa:30:03:12:12)
Internet Protocol Version 6, Src: 2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53, Dst: 2a13:1001::86:54:11:201
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 46156, Dst Port: 853, Seq: 1, Ack: 1, Len: 517

Transport Layer Security

[Stream index: 0]

TLSv1.3 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Client Hello

Content Type: Handshake (22)

Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301)

Length: 512

Handshake Protocol: Client Hello

Handshake Type: Client Hello (1)

Length: 508

Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303)

Random: 043f4f19b327ffd5a0ba547eb9a2400c32083d024d9afc1aa789cbd58fc07be

Session ID Length: 32

Session ID: cef4cce04a9e5a5e01c31a4a35f5aed5e9d89d33b5c5f9a3174fcd8d20b23d0e

Cipher Suites Length: 36

Handshake protocol message [tls.handshake], 512 bytes

0050 90 e6 ef 40 e2 5f 16 03 01 02 00 01 00 01 fc 03 ..@...-...-...
0060 03 04 3f 4f 19 b3 27 ff 05 a0 ba 54 7e b9 a2 40 ...?...-...-...
0070 0c 32 08 3d 02 4d 9a fc 1a a7 89 cb d5 8f cf 87 ...2...M...-...
0080 0e 20 ce fa cc e0 4a 9e 5e 5e 01 c3 1a 4a 35 f5 ...-...-...-...
0090 aa d5 e9 d8 9d 33 b5 c5 f9 a3 17 4f cd 8d 20 b2 ...+...3...-...
00a0 3d 0e 00 24 13 02 13 03 13 81 c0 2c c0 30 c0 2b ...-...\$...-...
00b0 c0 2f cc a9 cc a8 c0 24 c0 28 c0 23 c0 27 00 9f .../-...\$...-...
00c0 00 9e 00 6b 00 67 00 ff 01 00 01 0f 00 00 00 1b ...k-g...-...
00d0 00 19 00 00 16 70 72 6f 74 85 63 74 69 76 65 2a ...pro tective.
00e0 6a 6f 69 6e 64 6e 73 34 2e 85 75 00 0b 00 04 03 joindns4 .eu...
00f0 00 01 02 00 0a 00 16 00 14 00 1d 00 17 00 1e 00
0100 19 00 18 01 00 01 01 01 02 01 03 01 04 00 23 00#
0110 00 00 10 00 06 00 04 03 64 6f 74 00 16 00 00 00dot...
0120 17 00 00 00 0d 00 2a 00 28 04 03 05 03 06 03 08*...(-...
0130 07 00 00 00 09 08 0a 00 0b 08 04 00 05 00 06 04
0140 01 05 01 06 01 03 03 03 01 03 02 04 02 05 02 06
0150 02 00 2b 00 05 04 03 04 03 03 00 2d 00 02 01 01 ...+...-...
0160 00 33 00 26 00 24 00 1d 00 20 98 2f 0c 5d 47 c2 ...-8-\$--...-...
0170 c7 63 8a f4 01 b1 9f 65 a2 34 4a 86 c5 c3 4f b8 ...c...e...47...0

Packets: 303 - Displayed: 84 (27.7%)

Profile: Wireshark-Profile-JW-default



dot-doh-dog-doh3.pcap [UbuntuDockerGuest-4 eth0 to R2 FastEthernet1/0]

File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Wireless Tools Help



tcp.port eq 443

TCP.Str > UDP.Str > DNS > RS/R4/DHCPv6

No.	Time Delta	Source	Destination	Protocol	Src Port	Dst Port	TCP.Str	UDP.Str	DNS Qry or Host or SNI	Info
159	0.944790	2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	2a13:1001::86:54:11:1	TCP	58906	443	9			58906 → 443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64800 Len=0 MSS=
160	0.010891	2a13:1001::86:54:11:1	2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	TCP	443	58906	8			443 → 58906 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=64260
161	0.000029	2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	2a13:1001::86:54:11:1	TCP	58906	443	9			58906 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=64896 Len=
162	0.000402	2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	2a13:1001::86:54:11:1	TLSv1.3	58906	443	8		protective.joindns4.eu	Client Hello (SNI=protective.joindns4.eu)
163	0.011970	2a13:1001::86:54:11:1	2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	TCP	443	58906	9			443 → 58906 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=518 Win=64128 Le
164	0.000130	2a13:1001::86:54:11:1	2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	TLSv1.3	443	58906	9			Server Hello, Change Cipher Spec
165	0.000016	2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	2a13:1001::86:54:11:1	TCP	58906	443	9			58906 → 443 [ACK] Seq=518 Ack=134 Win=64768
166	0.000164	2a13:1001::86:54:11:1	2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	TLSv1.3	443	58906	9			Application Data
167	0.000011	2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	2a13:1001::86:54:11:1	TCP	58906	443	9			58906 → 443 [ACK] Seq=518 Ack=1562 Win=67712
168	0.000047	2a13:1001::86:54:11:1	2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	TLSv1.3	443	58906	9			Application Data, Application Data, Applicat
169	0.000000	2a13:1001::86:54:11:1	2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	TLSv1.3	443	58906	9			Application Data, Application Data
170	0.000008	2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	2a13:1001::86:54:11:1	TCP	58906	443	9			58906 → 443 [ACK] Seq=518 Ack=2626 Win=70528
171	0.000005	2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	2a13:1001::86:54:11:1	TCP	58906	443	9			58906 → 443 [ACK] Seq=518 Ack=3172 Win=73344
172	0.001947	2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	2a13:1001::86:54:11:1	TLSv1.3	58906	443	9			Change Cipher Spec, Application Data
173	0.009257	2a13:1001::86:54:11:1	2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	TCP	443	58906	9			443 → 58906 [ACK] Seq=3172 Ack=598 Win=64128
174	0.000017	2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	2a13:1001::86:54:11:1	TLSv1.3	58906	443	9			Application Data, Application Data, Applicat
175	0.000033	2a13:1001::86:54:11:1	2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	TLSv1.3	443	58906	9			Application Data
176	0.012499	2a13:1001::86:54:11:1	2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	TLSv1.3	443	58906	9			Application Data
177	0.000001	2a13:1001::86:54:11:1	2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	TLSv1.3	443	58906	9			Application Data
178	0.000000	2a13:1001::86:54:11:1	2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	TLSv1.3	443	58906	9			Application Data
179	0.000018	2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	2a13:1001::86:54:11:1	TLSv1.3	58906	443	9			Application Data

Frame 162: Packet, 603 bytes on wire (4824 bits), 603 bytes captured (4824 bits)
Ethernet II, Src: EliteGroupCo_0f:cc:5e (1c:69:7a:0f:cc:5e), Dst: PaloAltoNetw_03:12:12 (3c:fa:30:03:12:12)
Internet Protocol Version 6, Src: 2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53, Dst: 2a13:1001::86:54:11:1
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 58906, Dst Port: 443, Seq: 1, Ack: 1, Len: 517

Transport Layer Security

[Stream index: 5]

TLSv1.3 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Client Hello

Content Type: Handshake (22)

Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301)

Length: 512

Handshake Protocol: Client Hello

Handshake Type: Client Hello (1)

Length: 508

Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303)

Random: e59b78d1d0d994dae08e7b04cbd9d2d034d2dd6f42f49a964e5d57ba3e52a8af

Session ID Length: 32

Session ID: f64721a1b47c8620813e561e4805e69bd873578bd939cd42533f83ef2f176b0a

```
0050 2f c6 34 40 23 fb 16 03 01 02 00 01 00 01 fc 03 / 2f--- --...
0060 03 e5 9b 78 d1 d0 d9 94 da e0 8e 7b 04 cb d9 d2 ...x--- --{....
0070 d8 34 d2 dd 6f 42 f4 9a 96 4e 5d 57 ba 3e 52 a8 .4..oB..N]W>R.
0080 ef 20 f6 47 21 a1 b4 7c 86 20 81 3e 56 1e 48 05 .-G1..- ->V-H-
0090 e6 9b d8 73 57 8b d9 39 cd 42 53 3f 83 ef 2f 17 ...w..9 -BS?../-
00a0 5b 0a 00 24 13 02 13 03 13 01 c0 2c c0 30 c0 2b k..$.--- --,0.+
00b0 c0 2f cc a9 cc a8 c0 24 c0 28 c0 23 c0 27 00 9f ./.....$ -(.-#-'..
00c0 00 9e 00 6b 00 67 00 ff 01 00 01 8f 00 00 00 1b ...k-g-.....
00d0 00 19 00 00 16 70 72 6f 74 65 63 74 69 76 65 2e ...pro tective.
00e0 6a 6f 69 6e 64 6e 73 34 2e 65 75 08 0b 00 04 03 joindns4 .eu....
00f0 00 01 02 00 0a 00 16 00 14 00 1d 00 17 00 1e 00 .....
0100 19 00 18 01 00 01 01 01 02 01 03 01 04 00 23 00 .....#
0110 00 00 10 00 0e 00 0c 08 68 74 74 70 2f 31 2e 31 ..... http/1.1
0120 02 68 32 00 16 00 00 00 17 00 00 00 0d 00 2a 00 .h2.....*.
0130 28 04 03 05 03 06 03 08 07 08 08 08 09 08 0a 08 (.-----
0140 0b 08 04 08 05 08 06 04 01 05 01 06 01 03 03 03 .....
0150 01 03 02 04 02 05 02 06 02 00 2b 00 05 04 03 04 .....-a.....
0160 03 03 00 2d 00 02 01 01 00 33 00 26 00 24 00 1d .....-3-&$.--
0170 00 20 46 1f 7a d2 c1 c4 df c2 35 3f af 37 b0 e6 .F.2...-52.7..
```

Type of handshake message (tls.handshake.type), 1 byte

Packets: 303 - Displayed: 99 (32.7%)

Profile: Wireshark-Profile-JW-default

Palo Alto Traffic Log

01::86:54:11:201') or (addr.dst in '2a10:50c0::ad1:ff') or (addr.dst in '2a10:50c0::ad2:ff')

FROM ZONE	TO ZONE	SOURCE	DESTINATION	IP PROTO...	FROM PORT	TO PORT	APPLICATION	ACTION	RULE	SESSION END REASON	BYTES SENT	BYTES R
DMZ	Internet	2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	2a10:50c0::ad1:ff	udp	52874	443	quic-base			aged-out	2.9k	3.7k
DMZ	Internet	2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	2a10:50c0::ad2:ff	udp	33713	443	quic-base			aged-out	4.2k	3.9k
DMZ	Internet	2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	2a10:50c0::ad1:ff	udp	35898	853	unknown-udp	allow	NUC raus mit Logging	aged-out	4.1k	3.8k
DMZ	Internet	2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	2a10:50c0::ad1:ff	udp	52879	853	unknown-udp			aged-out	2.9k	3.5k
DMZ	Internet	2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	2a10:50c0::ad1:ff	udp	58092	853	unknown-udp			aged-out	4.1k	3.7k
DMZ	Internet	2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	2a10:50c0::ad1:ff	udp	44640	853	unknown-udp	allow	NUC raus mit Logging	aged-out	4.1k	3.7k
DMZ	Internet	2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	2a13:1001::86:54:11:201	tcp	46110	443	ssl			tcp-fin	2.1k	4.3k
DMZ	Internet	2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	2a13:1001::86:54:11:201	tcp	46100	443	ssl			tcp-fin	2.1k	4.4k
DMZ	Internet	2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	2a13:1001::86:54:11:201	tcp	46172	853	ssl	allow	NUC raus mit Logging	tcp-fin	1.6k	4.1k
DMZ	Internet	2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	2a13:1001::86:54:11:201	tcp	46162	853	ssl			tcp-fin	1.6k	4.1k
DMZ	Internet	2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	2a13:1001::86:54:11:201	tcp	46160	853	ssl			tcp-fin	1.6k	4.1k
DMZ	Internet	2a00:6020:ad0b:8300::c01:53	2a13:1001::86:54:11:201	tcp	46156	853	ssl	allow	NUC raus mit Logging	tcp-fin	1.6k	4.1k


DoH3 = UDP/443

DoQ = UDP/853

DoH = TCP/443

DoT = TCP/853

Secure DNS – Summary



- Pi-hole: <https://pi-hole.net/>
 - ✓ Blocking ads, tracking, malware (known malicious)
 - ✓ DNSSEC validation
 - ✓ [optional] own recursive resolver
 - DGAs
 - ✗ DNS-Exfiltration/-Tunneling
- <https://weberblog.net/pi-hole-installation-guide/>
- <https://github.com/hagezi/dns-blocklists>
- DNS4EU: <https://www.joindns4.eu/>



Status

● Active
● 3.8 q/s
● Load: 0.70 / 0.70 / 0.71
● Memory usage: 35.8 %

MAIN

[Dashboard](#)[Query Log](#)

GROUP MANAGEMENT

[Groups](#) 1[Clients](#) 6[Domains](#) 6 14[Lists](#) 808.936 30

DNS CONTROL

[Disable Blocking](#) <

SYSTEM

[Settings](#) <[Tools](#) <

DONATE

Total Queries

299.073

57 active clients

Queries Blocked

53.251

List blocked queries

Percentage Blocked

17.8%


List all queries

Domains on Lists


808.936

Manage lists

Total queries



Client activity



- Query and response logging is a MUCH DATA!
- Logging to a SIEM only does not block anything
- UDP size (→ IP fragmentation) vs. TCP
- Legitimate DNS tunnelings do exist 🧑
 - McAfee, Spotify, Apple

- DoQ, DoH3
- Oblivious DNS over HTTPS (ODoH)
- DNS cookies
- TSIG, EDNS(0)
- DANE: TLSA, SSHFP, CAA
- SPF/DKIM/DMARC
- ...

Thanks for watching ;)



#sf25eu